***Photo Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Children taking a break from mining, Nzibira, S. Kivu

The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America and the Congo
The United States House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services
Subcommittee on International Monetary Policy and Trade
Testimony by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele
Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Thursday, May 10, 2012

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member McCarthy and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee today. This hearing is the most important and pertinent discussion yet on Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act and its consequences for the people of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Today, I speak before you as a Congolese, and a concerned US citizen and consumer. I own two laptops, a smart phone and several other electronic devices, which may or may not contain minerals from Congo.

I would like to thank our friends in the many organizations that promoted Section 1502. I know that they galvanized thousands of people in a campaign to raise awareness on the continued conflict in Congo. Thanks to their work, many more people know about Congo today.

The views expressed in this statement are mine, and mine alone.

The best way to assess the cost and consequences of Section 1502 is to look at its premise, claims and impact on institution-building and the lives of Congolese.

In essence, Section 1502 seeks to bring peace to eastern Congo by regulating mineral trade through US law, cleaning up the supply chain and reducing militias’ access to financial means. Such a regulation would de facto curb the violence and human rights abuses. This approach to conflict resolution, however, is not grounded in the sound fundamentals of political economy and public policy. Section 1502 may work in the short-run, but it is not sustainable.

Mineral trade in eastern Congo is part of a wider war economy, which can only be regulated either by the most powerful armed groups working in collusion, the biggest armed group imposing its way on the smaller ones or by their backers seeking to maximize profits and preserve their own interests. As such, Section 1502 builds on a weak foundation and requires the buy-in of the very negative actors it seeks to tame. This approach perverts basic peacemaking models and rewards criminals and would-be spoilers.

Proponents of Section 1502 build their case on the most widely accepted narrative of U.S. Congo policy, which defines the predicament as a humanitarian crisis through the binary prism of sexual violence and the so-called conflict minerals. 1502 oversimplifies the problem and makes American taxpayers believe that if only the challenges of sexual violence and conflict minerals were solved, then Congo will get back on track and peace will follow.

But this narrative is wrong, and it has led to several ineffective initiatives, which have effectively turned U.S. Congo policy into a Kivu policy.

The Kivus represent no more than one fifteenth of Congo. Their problems stem from the failure of the state to discharge its duties and should be treated only as a part of a comprehensive national policymaking.

This binary prism also reflects the bleakest image of Congo and disenfranchises the Congolese people before the world, casting them as incompetent and incapable to solve their own problems. It then becomes imperative that they be rescued from their hopeless situation by the good peoples of the world.

As a result, the Congolese have been excluded from the policy discussion around Section 1502. This was evident last October when no Congolese was invited to speak at the Securities Exchange Commission Public Roundtable on Dodd-Frank 1502 held here in Washington, DC.

The truth is that no one understands mining in Congo better than the Congolese. By failing to engage the Congolese in an honest dialogue on the relationship between conflict and mining, proponents of Section 1502 failed to spur a national ownership of the initiative through a true partnership with the Congolese.

Congo may be a dysfunctional state, but the Congolese are among the world’s most resourceful peoples. Over the past several years, they have quietly and effectively undertaken landmark initiatives that are positively changing the mining landscape in their country. These initiatives include the Lutundula Report, which exposed the opaque exploitation of mineral resources and led to a comprehensive revision of mining contracts. As a result, several companies, including Canada’s First Quantum, lost their exploitation titles.

Pressured by local civil society organizations, the Parliament pushed for the restructuring of the Chinese barter investment deal, revisiting its terms and downgrading its value from $9 billion to $6 billion. The Senate published a report by the Mutamba Commission, which audited the mining sector and documented millions of dollars of financial loss that the Congolese State incurs due to mismanagement and bad governance.

Today, as we discuss Section 1502, the Parliament, the Fédération des Entreprises Congolaises, which is the equivalent of the US Chamber of Commerce, and civil society organizations supported by international organizations, such as the Open Society Foundations, are engaged in discussions setting the guidelines for the new mining code that would be enacted in the near future.

The current mining code, which was written over a decade ago as part of a World Bank project, disproportionately favors foreign investors at the expense of the Congolese State and the Congolese people. So far, proponents of Section 1502 have marched to their own beat, antagonizing corporations, inculpating consumers and ignoring Congolese initiatives.

If they really want to affect positive change in Congo’s mining sector, here is an opportunity for them to join the debate and policymaking in Kinshasa to ensure that the new mining code addresses their concerns. This is the best way to empower the Congolese, strengthen local institutions and induce national ownership of the transparency they seek.

This conflict, which has indirectly caused the death of over 6 million Congolese, has gone on for too long, and is now a scourge on the face of the planet. As we struggle to solve this calamity we would be better served by looking into Congo’s early history.

Between 1885 and 1908, Congo, then known as Congo Free State or the private estate of Belgium’s King Leopold II, was the theater of yet another holocaust driven not by mineral exploitation, but by the world’s hunger for a commodity. The industrial revolution demanded rubber and more of it. Business’ insatiable need for rubber and King Leopold’s immeasurable greed pushed the Belgians to design one of the world’s most repressive forced-labor structures.

The King’s agents established a quota system, which required that each village produce a specific amount of rubber over a time period. Force Publique troops were then used to enforce the quota and demand taxes of the population. Failure to meet the quota or tax requirements led soldiers to chop off limbs of the unlucky Congolese who fell below the mark. Villages were torched, women raped and the people left to starve to death or die of diseases. By 1924, nearly 10 million Congolese had perished under the yoke of the Leopoldian regime.

The similarity to the current situation is eerie. Like the conflict minerals, which are primarily exploited in the east, rubber was only exploited in some areas of the Congo Free State. Both problems were symptoms of larger systemic and regime perversions that subjugated an entire country.

But there is a big difference between the approach the activists took to expose and denounce King Leopold’s crimes and the way we choose to deal with the calamity today.

At a time when there was no computer, no internet, no fax and the telephone was still a curious invention, a shipping clerk in Liverpool decided to expose the mighty king and launched a campaign that would not end until Leopold relinquished possession of the colony and the regime and the system changed.

Working under great stress, those activists could have chosen the easy route to fundraising on behalf of the victims, and send them medicine and physicians to mend their wounds. They could have also elected to set up a blood-free certification scheme to ensure that the rubber that reached Europe and America was clean.

No. they knew that such a timid campaign would make them Leopold’s tacit accomplices and enablers, and prolong the suffering of the Congolese. Instead, they set out to destroy and change the repressive system and took the necessary time to accomplish their goal.

Today, at a time of instant satellite imagery, internet, instant messaging and other technological advances, our activism is lackluster, and devoid of moral courage in the face of the unnecessary suffering of the Congolese. We hedge our action and refuse to see the reality before us by covering our faces like little children, hoping it would go away. Instead, we search for enemies where they do not exist.

Last month, over 300 Congolese civil society organizations and their international counterparts showed great courage and published a report on security sector reform in Congo. This report calls for an end to the conflict through a comprehensive reform of security institutions, which include the military, law enforcement institutions such as the police and the courts, as well as customs and revenue agencies.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit a copy of that report for the record.

In Congo, businesses are not the enemies; armed groups and their international and local backers are. If we are serious we should go after them and help restore state authority so that the Congolese government can finally meet its obligations toward the people. This means that together we need to work on ending impunity at all levels of the polity. Only then can the Congolese know real peace.

The Congolese people want and deserve peace. We should empower them to that end. The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else. A competent, professional military – organized, resourced, trained and vetted – is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals.

In the absence of a strong Congolese state to protect its interests, Section 1502 will effectively certify the looting of Congo’s minerals.

Thank you.

Read the full testimony submitted for the record

FARDC elements in Bunia, Ituri -- Photo Mvemba Phezo Dizolele

Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform
Remarks by Mvemba Phezo Dizolele
Eastern Congo Initiative Fellow
to
The United Nations Security Council
New York City
Friday, April 19, 2012

To the Members of the United Nations Security Council

Ladies and gentlemen,

My name is Mvemba Phezo Dizolele. I am a writer, a fellow at Eastern Congo Initiative and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

I am honored to be here today with my colleagues to brief you on the urgent need for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I would like to thank you for your continued interest in developments in DRC and for your efforts to end that conflict. Particularly, I would like to thank the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations for making this briefing possible.

My remarks draw primarily from The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform, a new report authored by more than 300 Congolese and international civil society organizations that are concerned about the slow pace and flagrant failures of security sector reform in DRC and their impact on the Congolese people.

The report is appropriately named Taking a Stand on Security Sector Reform – because continued insecurity is the primary cause of suffering in DRC.  The Congo conflict, which has gone on too long in various forms has taken an unacceptable toll on the people of DRC, affecting all Congolese.

A lack of political will at the highest levels of the Congolese Government is the root of the failure to implement security sector reform.  The government of DRC, which has the primary responsibility to protect the Congolese people, has also failed to articulate a vision for security and to marshal the necessary assistance among international donors to achieve it.

But we believe that DRC’s civil society and the Government, in partnership with the international community, have the responsibility to take a clear, unambiguous stand on security sector reform. Over the past decade, security sector reform has been crippled by poor coordination among donors, who are driven primarily by competing short-term imperatives and objectives.

This approach has yielded piecemeal interventions, as the government of DRC has managed to play off donors against each other through bilateral arrangements. The resulting failures have led many to give up on systemic reform altogether.

Thus, the international community shares significant responsibility with the Congolese government. Little has been spent on security sector reform, despite its paramount strategic importance.  Between 2006 and 2010, official development aid disbursed for conflict, peace and security totaled just US$530 million, roughly 6 percent of total aid, excluding debt relief. Spending directly related to security system management and reform is even lower, US$84.7 million, or just 1 percent.

These factors have resulted in the view that the Congolese security sector, and particularly its military, are simply too dysfunctional for reform to be achieved. The result has been an increasing detachment on security sector reform. Support for military reform is now frequently subsumed under wider stabilization efforts. Though numerous projects are on-going to improve the justice system and build police capacity, and some progress has been made, the most important challenge facing the country, namely systemic transformation of the military, has largely been abandoned.

This is compounded by the view that pushing DRC government to take serious action is too dangerous to attempt – that effective sanctions would generate a political backlash, disrupt bilateral relationships, and risk defections, mutiny or insurrection.

But this view must no longer be allowed to dominate. The status quo, of failed reform and popular discontent, presents far greater dangers.

The most significant risk of renewed conflict comes from within the Congolese security services themselves, particularly the FARDC, and from the inability of the Congolese government to control its territory or protect its people.  Reform of the security sector would no doubt bring short-term pain, but the long-term risk of inaction is far greater.

The Congolese people want peace and with more political will, sustainable reform is possible. The investment made by Congo’s partners should not be wasted, or the people will continue to suffer.

A lack of political cohesion among donors after the 2006 elections undermined effective joint pressure on DRC government. We are asking for the international community to shepherd greater political will and show political cohesion in pressuring and assisting the Congolese government on effective security sector reform. After all, it is the key to sustainable peace in Congo.

Today, through this report, Congolese civil society organizations and their international counterparts and partners are in fact saying that enough is enough. The time has come to end this suffering through a comprehensive reform of security institutions, which include the military, law enforcement institutions such as the police and the courts, as well as customs and revenue agencies.

After the 2006 elections, the democratically elected government in Kinshasa made remarkable economic gains. DRC coasted through the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. In 2010, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank approved a $12.3 billion debt relief package to help alleviate Kinshasa’s financial burden, part of the Mobutu legacy. And largely because of investment in the country’s extractive sector, particularly copper, the World Bank expects Congo’s economy to grow over the next several years at around seven percent annually, one of the fastest economic growth rates in Africa – and in the world.

These gains notwithstanding, no meaningful and sustainable economic development and growth can happen in DRC with this prevalent level of insecurity. It is hard to rebuild a country when you cannot protect your most valuable resources – men, women and children. It is equally hard to rebuild when only a few people in power and those with guns benefit from the vast mineral resources.

The lack of competent security and law enforcement institutions has exacerbated the illegal exploitation and cross-border smuggling of resources. Armed groups and their affiliates control mining areas and trade routes, and tax all business activities in their areas of influence.

Furthermore, the haphazard integration of militias into the national army has far-reaching negative consequences. On one hand, it prolongs human rights abuses by militias and newly-integrated elements of the national army. On the other hand, it preserves the culture of impunity as part of the arrangement between the government and leaders of armed groups, making their prosecution and that of their associates difficult. This is why we are calling for a robust security sector reform.

This reform is long overdue. The Congolese people want and deserve peace. We should empower them to that end. The Congolese government’s inability to protect its people or control its territory undermines progress on everything else. A competent, professional military – organized, resourced, trained and vetted – is essential to solving problems from displacement, recruitment of child soldiers and gender-based violence, to economic growth or the trade in conflict minerals.

Without such a competent professional military, DRC is unable to stop the proliferation of militias. Instead, the government of DRC has chosen to compromise with militiamen and co-opt them into the national army with no disruption of their ranks and files. The lack of an adequate national integration program has resulted in the establishment of parallel commands and structures with the national army.

This means that the militias who join the national army remain in their areas of control and keep their command nearly intact. This arrangement allows the “former” militiamen to perpetrate abuses on the civilian populations and keep their access to local resources all under the protection of a Congolese military uniform.

The November elections and the ensuing violence and human rights abuses by security forces further exposed the deficiencies of the security sector. Now is the perfect time to encourage the government of DRC to present a detailed security sector reform plan, which the international community can help implement. Only after DRC undertakes a deep and meaningful security sector reform can the Congolese people enjoy real peace.

Progress in security sector reform is tangible and quantifiable. With the Congolese government leading the effort and international support for security sector reforms, progress can be made and safety improved.  For example, the continued presence of militia leaders that operate with impunity within the Congo military is one palpable element of security sector reform that requires immediate action.

Effective reform is a continuous effort, but the results can be measured sooner with specific and tangible benchmarks, including the disarmament and demobilization of militias, the integration of qualified former combatants into the national army and the unification of structures and commands into one single and strong line of command from Kinshasa.

The international donors must strike a new pact with the Congolese government.

This new pact must transcend traditional donors. China will need peace in DRC for future generations to reap the rewards from its investment. South Africa also has huge and growing economic interests in DRC. Angola has pressing issues of national security at stake. All need the stability that can only come from effective security sector reform.

The international financial institutions have rewarded the stabilization of Congo’s macro-economic situation with significant support. They must recognize that continued growth will be dependent on new investment, which in turn demands security.

Regional organizations, most importantly the African Union and Southern African Development Community, need to play an active role in applying effective pressure, and providing a framework for discussion.

Critically, this pact must also include the Congolese population.  Congolese civil society must have a key voice in defining a global vision for Congo’s security, and connecting high-level reform processes with those that matter most, Congo’s people.

We are at a critical juncture with regard to security sector reform. Viable prospects for peace in DRC call for a number of specific steps.  The Congolese leadership has to renew its political commitment to security sector reform at the highest levels; make military reform a top political priority of the new government; remove from office those individuals that are obstructing military reform and prosecute them if appropriate. DRC has to establish an effective coordination body on military reform to work with donors and the United Nations.

It is essential that donors and DRC’s international partners show greater political will and cohesion among them through renewed coordination both at the political and technical levels. A broad-based coalition of international partners will be vital, including African bilateral actors, regional organizations – notably SADC and the African Union – DRC’s key economic partners, and traditional donors. This would enable on-going information sharing and ensure complementarity of support, as well as ensuring coherent and concerted messaging.

This could initially be generated by an expanded Great Lakes ‘Contact Group’, bringing together all players to agree to parameters of benchmarks and follow-up. This would need to be backed with active diplomacy by key donors – the US, EU, UK, France and Belgium – to bring in the most important African bilateral actors, China and multilateral organizations crucial to managing political fall-out in Kinshasa.

Such a forum should launch a high-level political follow-up mechanism on security sector reform in DRC, under the auspices of the African Union and the United Nations, and the joint leadership of the Congolese Government, that would bring together all parties, including donors and multilateral actors.

It is also vital that this forum include representatives of Congolese civil society. Successful reform will depend on the input of the Congolese population, at all levels, and their views must be heard. The forum should meet quarterly, and provide for on-going oversight and a mechanism for the resolution of disputes or disagreement. It should also seek to address problems of policy incoherence, linking an on-going assessment of political conditions to decision making in multilateral bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Finally, a new working level cooperation mechanism on military reform should be launched in Kinshasa, again co-chaired by the Congolese government, with support or a permanent secretariat provided by MONUSCO, EUSEC or a mutually acceptable alternative. It would ensure harmonization, communication and effective burden-sharing. It would also map on-going and planned programs and interventions, maintain comprehensive project database, and act as a communication hub between donors, government and civil society.

International donors provide more than half of DRC’s budget.  This fact places the international community in prime position to steer the government of Congo to focus efforts on this important aspect of national progress.

As the Security Council reviews of the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Congo, it should consider empowering MONUSCO to provide support on military reform and increase its resources accordingly. The UN should also extend sanctions to those individuals impeding security sector reform.

With the current legitimacy crisis in DRC, one may wonder whether donors can find acceptable and credible interlocutors with whom to work. The answer is yes. Congolese civil society organizations along with the forces vives in parliament have shown sustained commitment to change. This determination has been manifest in the mining sector where civil society and Parliament led efforts and initiatives that produced a new mining code, a revision of dubious mining contracts, as well as the revision of the Chinese investment deal. With the appropriate level of support from donors, these forces vives from civil society and Parliament can generate the desired Congolese ownership of security sector reform and affect positive change in this area.

For security reform to be effective and sustainable, however, DRC must lead its design and implementation; the international community should work closely with DRC to achieve this goal.

Thank you.

UN Uruguyan naval forces on patrol on Lake Albert -- Photo Mvemba Phezo Dizolele

Jason Stearns
Director of Studies
Great Lakes Course
Rift Valley Institute

Augustin Katumba Mwanke, Photo AFP

Katumba Mwanke’s Death: What Next?

In DRC death is as commonplace as it is mysterious. But for better or for worse, in the local political realm some deaths are more important than others. Augustin Katumba Mwanke’s passing away is one such important death. He died yesterday when the private jet in which he and his colleagues were traveling missed the runway at Bukavu airport and crashed in a river.

No one who deals with Congo could escape his influence. As the most prominent and most important of President Joseph Kabila’s advisers, he was considered the regime’s de facto number two. Known as AK-47 or Katos, Katumba’s fingerprints seemed to be everywhere. United Nations reports on the illegal exploitation of DRC resources named him among the beneficiaries of questionable mining contracts. He was also often named in relation with several important financial and economic deals, such as the multi-billion dollar-deal with the Chinese, the restoration of the Inga Dam and many others.
Many observers within and outside the power circle saw him as the master strategist, the maître à penser, and Kabila’s gatekeeper and guardian angel. It was often said that nothing happened in Congo without his consent. A former high-school classmate of mine who served in the government once described Katumba’s influence to me in the following terms, “If Katumba likes you and says he will make you a minister, you will be a minister in the next government. It’s that simple.” Not since the days of Bisengimana Rwema, Mobutu’s mighty chief of staff, has a presidential adviser wielded so much power – real or otherwise.
Trained as an engineer, he had a rich and diverse ethnic and professional background, which made him competitive within the presidential circle. In a political context where ethnicity matters, Katumba’s Katangan origins made him safe and acceptable to the regime’s power-brokers. But equally important were his deal-making skills and network of contacts, which he had developed as a banker in South Africa. As a governor of Katanga under Laurent Kabila, he further honed his political savvy and expanded his exposure to the mining investment community.
By the time Joseph Kabila became president and appointed Katumba to his government, the two men had been close friends for a few years. The young president relied on a small circle of advisers who helped him navigate DRC’s politics. It was this circle that set the country on a new course. They helped Kabila dismiss his late father’s coterie of old advisers who held DRC hostage to their antiquated, revolutionary ways. They also guided Kabila through the critical negotiations with rebel movements that led to the Sun City Accord, and eventually, to the 2006 elections that legitimized Kabila’s presidency. Katumba himself was elected to the national assembly in 2006 and served as secretary-general of the coalition for the presidential majority.
Despite his signature low-profile approach to politics and business, Katumba made many enemies among Kabila’s associates. Over the years, tensions have been reported between him and the likes of Vital Kamerhe, who fell out with Kabila in 2009. His detractors accused him of running a shadow, parallel government staffed with people loyal to him alone, which undermined the official government and did not serve the interests of DRC.
Nevertheless, over the years Katumba saw many of his detractors relegated to less influential positions away from Kabila. Building on his background, network of contacts and power base, he made himself indispensable to the President as his strategist, go-to-man, top gun and money man. Whatever Katumba did so impressed Kabila that he maintained him in that powerful position for the 11 years of his presidency.
But the 2011 elections that were supposed to extend Kabila’s legitimacy and grant him another 5-year term were poorly managed and marred by lack of transparency and credibility. The opposition has rejected the results, which has created a legitimacy crisis. Both Kabila and Etienne Tshisekedi have claimed victory. As a group of Congolese civil society organizations said in a recent letter to UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon, “DRC is now grappling with a two-headed leadership crisis with one legal president without legitimacy and one legitimate president with no legality.”
The coalition for the presidential majority that Katumba once led as secretary-general has emerged from these elections much weaker and fragmented, further complicating matters for President Kabila. As Kabila’s right hand man, it was Katumba’s mission to mend ways between the various parties of the majority and build a solid platform in support of the President. This is more important now that the leaders of these parties vie for the post of prime minister, who has the power to form the next government.
Katumba’s death changes everything, as it will reconfigure the council of power-brokers around Kabila and exacerbate the power struggle among the many ambitious caciques now eager to fill the void. For now, however, Katumba’s death exposes President Kabila and his allies, making them vulnerable to the winds of change and discontent blowing across DRC.

Children working in mines, South Kivu

Armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo make millions each year from illicit mining of “conflict minerals” used in cell phones and computers. Conflict mineral mining generates between $300 million and $1.4 billion per year, and thousands of Congolese families live off the industry.

The US government attempted to curb the purchase of conflict minerals from the DRC by passing the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, which included a provision requiring public companies to report buying material with minerals that are not “conflict-free.”

However, critics argue that the legislation has allegedly deprived one to two million already impoverished people of their livelihood.

In this episode, journalist and foreign policy analyst Mvemba Dizolele and Sasha Lezhnev, a policy consultant with the Enough Project, join The Stream to discuss conflict minerals from the DRC.

Watch the Program

Voting, Kinshasa

On December 15, the US Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs held a hearing  on the election crisis in DRC. I was one of the expert witnesses along with Ambassador Johnnie Carson (Assistant Secretary of State),  Mark Schneider (Vice President, International Crisis Group) and Tony Gambino (Fellow, Eastern Congo Initiative).

Here are my oral and written statements:

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and Members of the Subcommittee on African
Affairs: Thank you for the invitation and honor to testify before your committee today. I greet
you on behalf of the millions of Congolese in the homeland who look up to the United States of
America as a beacon of democracy. I would also like to thank you on behalf of the Congolese
community of the United States for your interest in the alarming developments in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Thank you.

Watch the hearing

Read the statement

Watch Q & A Session

Bulletins at the compilation center, Kinshasa

Below is a joint statement from organizationsand individuals calling for international action in Congo:

We, the undersigned organizations and individuals, are deeply troubled by the lack of critical engagement that the international community has shown throughout the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Carter Center, the European Union, the Catholic Church and other national election observation organizations found that the elections held on November 28, 2011 were deeply flawed and marred by widespread irregularities. In order to prevent further violence and provide legitimacy to the government, we call on the United States and other members of the international community to take these immediate steps:
1) State clearly that they do not perceive the election results as legitimate and call on President Kabila to delay his inauguration ceremony until steps are taken to address these serious allegations. If the inauguration proceeds as scheduled, the United States and other international missions should consider non-attendance or at a minimum send a lower ranking diplomatic officer instead of the Ambassador.

Read full statement

Phil Moore / AFP - Getty Images A Congolese army soldier stamps on Fabien Mutomb, provincial vice-president of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS), as the army and police break-up a peaceful protest in Lubumbashi, DR Congo, on Dec. 14, 2011.

Phil Moore / AFP – Getty Images

Ballots arriving at the compilation center in Fikin, Kinshasa

Today, nowhere are crises more predictable than in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And yet, when they unfold as anticipated, Western policymakers and diplomats always seem caught off guard — raising questions about the competence, willingness, and commitment of the Kinshasa-based diplomatic corps and the United Nations mission to discharge their responsibilities.

Nothing underscores the apathy and inconsistency that characterize Western diplomacy in Congo more than the current impasse between incumbent President Joseph Kabila and veteran opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, each of whom has claimed victory in the Nov. 28 presidential polls. The legitimacy crisis threatens to trigger another round of civil war in a country that has already lost over six million of its people to the repercussions from a long and senseless conflict.

Read the full article

Downloading Ballots at the Compilation Center in Fikin, Kinshasa

The Carter Center’s statement.

Carter Center: DRC Presidential Election Results Lack Credibility

The Carter Center finds the provisional presidential election results announced by the Independent National Election Commission (CENI) on Dec. 9 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to lack credibility. CENI results point to the re-election of incumbent President Joseph Kabila with 49 percent of the vote followed by Etienne Tshisekedi with 32 percent and Vital Kamerhe with 7.7 percent.  Voter turnout was 58 percent.

Carter Center observers reported that the quality and integrity of the vote tabulation process has varied across the country, ranging from the proper application of procedures to serious irregularities, including the loss of nearly 2,000 polling station results in Kinshasa.  Based on the detailed results released by CENI, it is also evident that multiple locations, notably several Katanga province constituencies, reported impossibly high rates of 99 to 100 percent voter turnout with all, or nearly all, votes going to incumbent President Joseph Kabila. These and other observations point to mismanagement of the results process and compromise the integrity of the presidential election.  Candidates and parties have a limited time to submit any complaints to the Supreme Court, and tabulation for the legislative elections is ongoing.

The problems observed in the tabulation and announced results are compounded by inadequate access for observers at multiple compilation centers around the country and no official access to the national results center in Kinshasa. The Carter Center is therefore unable to provide independent verification of the accuracy of the overall results or the degree to which they reflect the will of the Congolese people.

Challenges in the results process were further evident in the CENI delays in announcing the results first for two days after the original date of Dec. 6 and then a second one-day delay to Dec. 9.  Presidential candidates and the Congolese people are to be commended for waiting peacefully for the announcement of results, and the Center encourages all actors to maintain the same level of responsibility. It is also the responsibility of Congolese political actors and institutions to conduct their own examination of the election results and identify political solutions.  The Carter Center is ready to assist in these processes if requested and appropriate.

The Carter Center maintained 26 teams of international, impartial observers deployed in Kinshasa and the 10 provinces for the counting and tabulation.  This assessment is based on direct observation during visits to 25 local results compilation centers (CLCRs) where tabulation of results was conducted and a preliminary examination of the published results.

The Tabulation Process

The electoral law^[1] provides that immediately after counting, results forms are signed by all members of the polling station and witnesses, a copy of the results form is given to witnesses,^[2] a copy of the results form is posted outside the polling station, and results forms and other election materials (ballot boxes, counted and unused ballots) are sent to the 169 CLCR.  All materials are supposed to be collected and transported securely to the CLCR.

Heads of polling centers were responsible for collecting and delivering all polling station material from their polling center including four sets of envelopes containing results by polling centers; one each for the CLCR, the national board of CENI, the provincial executive secretary of CENI (SEP), and the Supreme Court.  Upon arrival at the CLCR, heads of polling centers present themselves to a reception desk to sign over all of their election materials. If all material was accounted for, the heads of polling centers were released of responsibility and sent home.

Upon reception, the results envelope for the CLCR is sent to the collation desk, while the others are sent to archiving for later transmission to their final recipients.  The results documents then pass through four desks where they are checked for consistency, the data entered on computers and compiled for transmission to the SEP and ultimately posted in front of the CLCR.  At one stage, inconsistent documents may be reconstructed the basis of the counting form and polling station activity log by a team of three CENI members.  After the compilation of results from all the constituencies under its responsibility, CLCRs transmit them to the SEP who consolidate for the province and send these to the CENI for publication of preliminary results.^[3]

General Findings

Soon after election day, unofficial results started to circulate online and via SMS.  Additional threatening messages were sent to members of domestic and international election observation missions.  On Dec. 3, the minister of interior ordered the suspension of the emission and reception of SMS justified by the reportedly massive distribution of anonymous messages of intimidation, death threats, and calls for violence.  This measure is an excessive attempt to deny freedom of expression; the authors of such messages could have been identified through regular channels of investigation.

Other heavy handed responses were applied to media. The Superior Council of Audio Visual Communication suspended two broadcast networks without an official decision and one newspaper close to the opposition.  In Mbuji Mayi, police closed broadcaster RLTV without cause.

In comparison to the 2006 elections, the counting and tabulation procedures remained similar in their complexity which could have contributed to the uneven application across CLCRs and created opportunities for manipulation of results. As was the case five years ago, the logistical challenges of collecting, securing, and recording the results caused major difficulties for which CENI showed an insufficient level of preparation.  CENI staff from voting centers and CLCRs were required to work extremely long hours for days at a time, often without adequate shelter, food, or water in trying and crowded physical conditions.

In most of the cases observed, CLCRs were properly secured by police (military in some cases), however, in 15 percent of the cases their behavior could have influenced or intimidated CLCR personnel.  In 15 percent of CLCRs observed, the reception and handling of sensitive election material did not follow the established procedures.  Candidate witnesses were present in almost 90 percent of the cases but their physical position in the CLCR and access to information varied, disabling some from following all steps of compilation.

Where problems with results paperwork necessitated a recount of ballot papers, witnesses were present in only a slim majority of cases observed.  Archiving was reported to be disorganized in 25 percent of the cases and the results envelopes bound for the SEP, CENI, and the Supreme Court did not leave the CLCRs before the end of tabulation. Equipment to transmit electronic record of scanned individual polling station results forms to SEP and CENI was present in 73 percent of the cases but observers could not always confirm if they were functional or in consistent use.

In many instances, heads of voting centers waited outside CLCRs for several hours and sometimes days with no organized provision of shelter, food, or water.  Bulky items (mainly used and non used ballot papers and ballot boxes) were stockpiled outside of CLCRs, most of the time without care or protection from the weather.  Even more importantly, bags of ballot papers and the envelopes containing results forms and other polling station paperwork were opened by heads of voting centers outside before they were officially received.  After reception, the working conditions and storage provisions of CLCR varied.  In some instances, bags of ballot papers were piled wherever floor space allowed, or spilled to the floor where they were stepped on by personnel because of lack of space.  In more spacious centers, material was either stored in warehouses and piled in a more ordered manner or left outside, covered by tents and tarpaulins.  Where a lack of organization in the storage of sensitive material prevailed, it was nearly impossible for CENI personnel to recover misplaced material.

In multiple observed CLCR (e.g. Boma, Matadi, Bandundu, Mweka, and others) Carter Center observers found tabulation processes that they rated fair or good in 60 percent of cases.  The overall assessment of other locations varied, with 40 percent rated poor based on an overall assessment of the application of procedures.

Tabulated Results Lack Credibility

The tabulation process in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi proved to be especially problematic.  The lack of preparation evident in these two major cities resulted in serious irregularities and produced a tabulation process that lacks credibility.  The generalized deficiencies described above prevailed in the extreme in both locations.  Sensitive materials arrived by various means of transport, both official and private, were handled haphazardly, sometimes with bags and results envelopes opened, were stockpiled outside with insufficient or no protection from the elements (after a rain storm results forms were found hanging on sticks to dry), heads of polling centers were observed opening sealed envelopes with results forms and completing or altering paperwork in breach of procedure.  Coupled with the general disorganization of these centers, a significant number of polling station results were lost.  In Kinshasa, nearly 2,000 polling station results have been lost (representing as many as 350,000 voters) and hence will never be tallied. Another 1,000 polling station results have been lost elsewhere in the country (representing 500,000 voters).

Also in Kinshasa, the uneven application of procedures led to heated debates on how to treat the unsigned results forms, often leading to partisan interpretation of procedures.  In some instances, contested documents were said to have been transferred to the Supreme Court which at this stage remains impossible to confirm.  CLCR staff sometimes appeared to be poorly trained with some staff reporting that colleagues had received no training.  Furthermore, ineffective communication of procedural decisions made while the tabulation was ongoing resulted in important decisions being applied unequally, raising additional possibilities of manipulation of results, as neither CENI staff nor witnesses and observers could verify correct procedures.

Physical and information access for observers and witnesses was inadequate and varied from day to day and among CENI staff at different CLCR stations resulting in a lack of transparency of the process.  In some instances, senior CENI officials directly obstructed observation by Carter Center observers.  For example, in Lubumbashi, Carter Center observers witnessed the president of a CLCR instructing his staff during their training not to give out any information to the observers. Similar instructions were given to CENI staff during tabulation in Kinshasa.

According to the electoral law, each CLCR is to send its compiled result form to the SEP, who in turn sends compiled results for the province to CENI in Kinshasa for the announcement of a national result.  It appears that only the compiled CLCR result forms have been sent to CENI, although the commission should receive its own envelope with an original copy of the polling station results.  No comparison of physical results forms for verification of CLCR compilation at the national level could be observed and therefore assessed by the Center. Although formally requested from CENI, no official access was granted to Carter Center observer (or any others) to the national results center (CNT).^[4] Thus, data transmission and management have been conducted in a nontransparent manner, eliminating a possible, and important, avenue to build confidence in the final election results, if observers and witnesses had been able to verify the handling of compiled results (CENI’s organizing law contains a general transparency provision, the spirit of which should apply throughout the entire electoral process, even if specific arrangements are not specified in the electoral law).^[5]

The provisional results announced by CENI reveal multiple results that lack credibility.  In Katanga province, two CLCR results are especially notable.  The Mulemba Nkulu CLCR reports 99.46 percent voter turnout with 100 percent of votes, or 266,886 for Joseph Kabila, and fewer than 0.5 percent blank or null votes.  All polling stations reported.  Kabongo CLCR records similar high voter turnout with 227,885 votes for Kabila and only three votes for other candidates.  A total of eight CLCR in Katanga report voter participation above 80 percent, far above the national average of 58 percent, and vote shares of 89 percent or higher for Kabila.

Although the specific mechanism through which such vote totals may have been generated is unclear, numerous conditions cited in previous Carter Center reports may have been enabling factors, notably concerns about the credibility of the voter register and the potential multiple voting through abuse of the derogation votes and list of omitted voters, or through manipulation of vote totals at polling station or various stages of the tabulation.  Thorough analysis with the records of domestic observers and candidate witnesses could yield more information.

Review of locations with similar high percentage votes for Etienne Tshisekedi does not reveal the same coincidence of perfect collection of polling station results and extremely high voter turnout.  Notably, although Tshisekedi scored very well in much of Kasai Occidental, 11 of 12 CLCR reported voter turnout below the national average, and in nine CLCR returns from Kasai Oriental where he received 90 percent of more of the vote, the rate of results collection and voter turnout were within reasonable variation of national rates.

This assessment does not propose that the final order of candidates is necessarily different than announced by CENI, only that the results process is not credible.  However, further analysis of preliminary results could reveal other important patterns and variations suggestive of a vote counting and tabulation that lacked uniform application to all Congolese voters.  Additional analysis will be provided in future Carter Center reports.

Background: The Carter Center international election observation mission has been in the DRC since Aug. 17, 2011, following an invitation from CENI. The mission was led by former President of Zambia Rupiah Bwezani Banda and Vice President of Carter Center Peace Programs Dr. John Stremlau, and is composed of 70 observers from 27 countries.

The Center thanks CENI and all those Congolese who have welcomed Carter Center observers and given their time to meet with them.

The Center’s observation mission in the DRC is conducted in accordance with international standards for elections, and the observation mission was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct for International Observers that was adopted at the United Nations in 2005 and has been endorsed by 37 observation groups.

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A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, The Carter Center has helped to improve life for people in more than 70 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; improving mental health care; and teaching farmers in developing nations to increase crop production. The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide.